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his discussion ofmysticaJ states, are more sophisticated and more cautious 
than has previously been recognized. Although in identifying his own ·over-
beliefs' James clearly inclines toward the religious hypothesis, his aim in the 
closing chapters of Varieties is not to validate this hypothesis but to offer 'a 
theoretical explanation of how individuals might subjectively experience a 
presence that they take to be an external power, when such is not necessarily 
the case' (62). Taves contends that James' attention to similarities between 
religious and non-religious phenomena, his avoidance of descriptive reduc-
tionism, and his appreciation of the fragmentary nature of selfhood are 
features of his thought from which contemporary theorists of religion can 
still learn. Together with the other essays collected here, hers is likely to 
generate continuing interest in James' seminal study. 
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Theses regarding the ultimate nature of things constituted an essential 
starting point on the basis of which Frank Ramsey formulated his ideas, and 
an integral part of his worldview. An at least general knowledge of such 
theses is thus one key element to a proper understanding of the contributions 
he made to a vast range of subjects. However, not much can be found in the 
literature that fosters the study of Ramsey's ontological positions. This 
collection of essays goes some way towards filling this gap. It is surely not a 
comprehensive overview of Ramsey's ontology, but it offers some interesting 
interpretative suggestions and critical analyses. 
The starting point, and the theme around which most of the coJlection 
revolves, is Ramsey's criticism of the distinction between particulars and 
universals as an unwaJTanted ontological conclusion derived from linguistic 
practice, which he formuJated in his 'Universals' (1925). This doesn't come 
as a surprise, since this is one of the most renowned of Ramsey's essays, and 
perhaps the only one that has an overtly ontological 'flavour'. 
In the first contiibution, Maurin and Sahlin examine this paper and, 
following a suggestion of Mellor's, claim that Ramsey's argument is best 
understood as a means to avoid Bradley's classical 'relation regress' (the 
reader is offered here a useful analysis of what distinguishes vicious from 
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non-vicious infinite regresses.) By denying any intrinsic difference between 
universals and particulars, that is. Ramsey allegedly avoids an apparently 
inevitable proliferation of intermediate entities that the existence of such a 
distinction would entai l. This, Maurin and Sahlin maintain, implies that 
'Universals' must be interpreted as suggesting a fact ontology, that is, that 
'the world is a world of facts' (13). 
However, Maurin and Sahlin go on to argue, a fact ontology fails to steer 
clear of Bradley's regress, for as soon as we try to distinguish between the 
internal constituents of facts and/or between facts, the 'infiltration' of an 
infinite series of relations immediately occurs again. Indeed, if there is 
anything like the regress formulated by Bradley, it points towards the 
necessity of a conception ofreality as a Parmenidean unchangeable 'One' (27). 
In his complex and rich paper, Hochberg goes back one step and criticizes 
Ramsey"s very attempt to deflate the ontological distinction between particu-
lars and universals. He focuses on the fact that, throughout his analysis, 
Ramsey appears io assume the concept, of'predicable', that is, of what can be 
predicated of something else as its s ubject (32), so implicitly employing 
exactly the distinction he intends to reject. Not only does one have to 
acknowledge an intrinsic asymmetry between what is predicable and what 
is not: being predicable is simply not a purely linguistic featw·e. It coincides 
with the ontological asymmetry between what is repeatable ('multiply in-
stantiable'), and what is not (39). Curiously, Hochberg doesn't say much on 
the crucial ontological notion of multiple instantiability, preferring to focus 
on the - prevalently linguistic - concept of predicability. 
In a more sympathetic article, McBride defends Ramsey's argument from 
the allegedly lethal objection, first formulated by A.iistotle, to the effect that 
only qualities can be negated, i.e., only properties have equally real contrar-
ies. He first distinguishes an ontological and a weaker, merely linguistic, 
interpretation of Ramsey's thesis, and shows that the Aristotelian 'dictum' 
is certainly ineffective, by itself, against the former, which is nevertheless 
what Ramsey really aimed to convey. Moreover, McBride convincingly argues 
that in its weaker version too Ramsey's thesis can be secw-ed against 
Aristotle-like criticisms. He shows that Dummett misinterprets Ramsey's 
arguments, failing to correctly understand the basic point formulated in 
'Universals': namely, that there is no reason to claim that names are less 
incomplete than predicates and, if they are not, then ontology remains 
underdetermined by language, and it is consequently perfectly possible to 
formulate a language in which subjects can in fact be negated (70). Also 
Geach, who appears to offer clear-cut logical arguments against the possibil-
ity of negating subjects, is shown to only demonstrate that one cannot negate 
subjects and accept conjunctive predicates at the same time (80); which of 
these two things to presuppose and make an integral part of one's language-
structure. though, remains an open choice. 
In his contribution, Koslow comments on an unpublished paper read by 
Ramsey in 1922, in which two basic interconnected ideas are presented -
first, that the world is simple and there are no complexes, and second that 
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truth is an incomplete symbol. To provide support to the first claim, Ramsey 
argues against the existence of complex properties, complex propositions (as 
they appear, most notably, in probability calculus) and complex beliefs. More 
importantly, he denies that there are facts (91): facts too are complexes that 
can be reduced to more elementary parts (i.e., subjects instantiating proper-
ties or relations holding between individuals). This constitutes the bridge 
from the simplicity thesis to Ramsey's other central conclusion in the paper, 
namely that regarding truth: since there are no facts, truth cannot be 
correspondence between these and propositions, and the most plausible way 
of understanding it is as an incomplete symbol which is different from, but 
equivalent to, the identity function. 
It is worth noting that Koslow's reconstruction, based as it is on the claim 
that facts do not exist as primitive entities, appears to directly contradict 
Maurin and Sah]in's interpretation of'Universals' as relying upon (or natu-
rally tending towards) a fact ontology. Despite the latter's claim that this 
shouldn't worry us, for 'at different times of his life, Ramsey t1ied our 
different positions' (13), the reader is left wondering whether this is really 
the case or, instead, a more consistent position can be attributed to Ramsey. 
It would certainly be interesting to know more about this issue. 
In the last short piece, Sahlin and Kasa Palme discuss Ramsey's well-
known suggestion that scientific theories should be formulated as sentences 
in which the unobservable entities appear as existentially bound variables 
(the so-called 'Ramsey-sentences'). They clarify that, despite the use they are 
sometimes put to (as ways to avoid realist commitment to unobservables), 
Ramsey-sentences were not so intended by Ramsey, who was rather an 
opponent ofreductive empi1icism, and actually brought them into play with 
a view to specifying the sort of ontological commitment beyond what we are 
directly acquainted with that theories force upon us. The core of the paper is 
then devoted to showing that in dynamical contexts, based upon 'experimen-
tal semantics', there is no unique way of'Ramseifying' a theory. 
Overall, Ramsey's Ontology certainly provides some stimulating discus-
sions of central themes of the Cambridge philosopher's ontological views. 
However, a good amount of previous knowledge is assumed, and on some 
issues (most patently, whether or not Ramsey endorsed a fact ontology), 
suggestions are given that go in opposite directions. Considering thjs, and 
also the book's limited length, the collection would have certainly benefited 
from a short c1itical introduction offering some background to the material 
and defining some sort of 'guiding thread' for the reader to follow. At any 
rate, Ramsey's Ontology does represent an interesting initial step towards a 
better knowledge of both an author and an area of philosophy that deserve 
more attention. 
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